Using complexity to protect elections

Communications of the ACM

Volumn 53, Issue 11, 2010, Pages 74-82

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^c  

^a AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^b ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION SYSTEMS; HARDNESS RESULT; NEW MODEL; ONE-FACTOR; POLITICAL SCIENCE; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ATTACKS; SOCIAL CHOICE;

COMPUTATION THEORY; SURVEYS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 78149275395     PISSN: 00010782     EISSN: 15577317     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1839676.1839696     Document Type: Review

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