Frequent manipulability of elections: The case of two voters

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5385 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 653-664

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNET; PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION; WINE;

COMPUTATIONAL HARDNESS; MANIPULABILITY; SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS;

THEOREM PROVING;

EID: 58849128251     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_71     Document Type: Conference Paper

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