Approximability of manipulating elections

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2008, Pages 44-49

  Brelsford, Eric ^a   Faliszewski, Piotr ^b   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^a   Schnoor, Henning ^a   Schnoor, Ilka ^a  

^a Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^b University of Rochester   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; BIONICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

APPROXIMABILITY; FULLY POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION SCHEMES; INAPPROXIMABILITY;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 57749205169     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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