Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control

Mathematical Logic Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 397-424

  Hemaspaandra, Edith ^a   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^b   Rothe, Jörg ^c  

^a Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^b University of Rochester   (United States)

^c HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Computational social choice; Multiagent systems; Preference aggregation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349157702     PISSN: 09425616     EISSN: 15213870     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/malq.200810019     Document Type: Article

References (61)

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