A richer understanding of the complexity of election systems

Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 375-406

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^a   Rothe, Jörg ^c  

^a University of Rochester   (United States)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

bribery; computational social choice; control; manipulation, voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84895288166     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9688-4_14     Document Type: Chapter

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