The shield that never was: Societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control

Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK '09

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 118-127

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^c   Rothe, Jörg ^d  

^a AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^b Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^c University of Rochester   (United States)

^d HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CASE HARDNESS; NP-HARDNESS; POLITICAL SCIENCE; SOCIETAL PREFERENCES;

HARDNESS;

EID: 70350637326     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1562814.1562832     Document Type: Conference Paper

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