Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 627-634

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SOCIAL ASPECTS; THEOREM PROVING;

BENEFICIAL MANIPULATION; GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE THEOREM; VOTING RULES;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750693386     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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