Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 33, Issue , 2008, Pages 149-178

  Meir, Reshef ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a   Zohar, Aviv ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING;

COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS; SOCIAL CHOICE; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; VOTING SYSTEMS; WORST-CASE COMPLEXITY;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 55349124346     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2566     Document Type: Article

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