On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 217-224

  Christian, Robin ^a   Fellows, Mike ^b   Rosamond, Frances ^b   Slinko, Arkadii ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE   (Australia)

^c UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Lobbying; Parametrized complexity; Referendum

Indexed keywords

EID: 35248849763     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0028-1     Document Type: Article

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