Improved bounds for computing kemeny rankings

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 620-626

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Davenport, Andrew ^b   Kalagitanam, Jayant ^b  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

KEMENY RANKINGS; KEMENY RULE; MULTIPLE AGENTS;

ALGORITHMS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATION THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; LINEAR PROGRAMMING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 33750726064     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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