A short introduction to computational social choice

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4362 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 51-69

  Chevaleyre, Yann ^a   Endriss, Ulle ^b   Lang, Jérôme ^c   Maudet, Nicolas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^c CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BIBLIOGRAPHIC RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS; COMPUTABILITY AND DECIDABILITY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE; FAIR DIVISION ALGORITHMS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 38149069521     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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