Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 171, Issue 5-6, 2007, Pages 255-285

  Hemaspaandra, Edith ^a   Hemaspaandra, Lane A ^b   Rothe, Jörg ^c  

^a Rochester Institute of Technology   (United States)

^b University of Rochester   (United States)

^c HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Computational complexity; Computational resistance; Condorcet voting; Destructive control; Election systems; Multiagent systems; Plurality voting; Preference aggregation; Vote suppression

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COST EFFECTIVENESS; HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION;

APPROVAL VOTING; COMPUTATIONAL RESISTANCE; CONDORCET VOTING; DESTRUCTIVE CONTROL; ELECTION SYSTEMS; PLURALITY VOTING; PREFERENCE AGGREGATION; VOTE SUPPRESSION;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34147140610     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2007.01.005     Document Type: Article

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