Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: An organizational economics approach to strategic management

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 223-242

  Kim, Jongwook ^a   Mahoney, Joseph T ^b  

^a WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744433857     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1218     Document Type: Article

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