Behavioral assumptions and theory development: The case of transaction cost economics

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 27, Issue 11, 2006, Pages 999-1011

  Tsang, Eric W K ^a  

^a WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Behavioral assumption; Critical realism; Organization theory; Reduced model; Structural model; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COST EFFECTIVENESS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS; THEOREM PROVING;

BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTION; CRITICAL REALISM; ORGANIZATION THEORY; REDUCED MODEL; STRUCTURAL MODEL; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 33750071101     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.553     Document Type: Article

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