Influences of relative rewards of top managers on firm performance

Strategic Organization

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 311-335

  Wright, Peter ^a   Kroll, Mark ^b   Lado, Augustine ^c   Elenkov, Detelin ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

^b LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CLARKSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

executive rewards; firm performance; strategic profile; top management team members; tournament theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84993723114     PISSN: 14761270     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1476127005055794     Document Type: Article

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