The epistemic fault line in corporate governance

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 256-271

  Donaldson, Thomas ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858027641     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2010.0407     Document Type: Article

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