Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action

Ecological Economics

Volumn 120, Issue , 2015, Pages 394-405

  Midler, Estelle ^a   Pascual, Unai ^a,b,c   Drucker, Adam G ^d   Narloch, Ulf ^e   Soto, José Luis ^f  

^a BASQUE CENTRE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE BC3   (Spain)

^b BASQUE FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^d BIOVERSITY INTERNATIONAL   (Italy)

^e WORLD BANK   (United States)

^f Centro de Investigación de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambiente CIRNMA   (Peru)

Author keywords

Agricultural biodiversity; Communication; Cooperation; Crowding effects; Field experiment; Public goods

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL ECOSYSTEM; BIODIVERSITY; COLLECTIVE ACTION; COMMUNICATION; CONSERVATION PLANNING; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT; ECOSYSTEM SERVICE; FARMERS ATTITUDE; FIELD METHOD; PUBLIC GOODS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

PERU;

EID: 84948169014     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.006     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Andreoni J. Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence. J. Polit. Econ. 1989, 1447-1458.
2. Andreoni J. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving. Econ. J. 1990, 100(401):464-477.
3. Astudillo D. Keen on Quinoa. CGIAR News http://www.cgiar.org/web-archives/www-cgiar-org-enews-october2007-story_10-html/.
4. Bowles S. Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine "the moral sentiments": evidence from economic experiments. Science 2008, 320(5883):1605-1609.
5. Bowles S., Gintis H. Behavioural science: homo reciprocans. Nature 2002, 415(6868):125-128.
6. Brañas-Garza P., Durán M.A., Espinosa M.P. Favouring friends. Bull. Econ. Res. 2012, 64(2):172-178.
7. Cardenas J.C. How do groups solve local social dilemmas: lessons from experimental economics in the field. Environ. Dev. Sustain. 2000, 2:305-322.
8. Cardenas J.C., Carpenter J. Behavioural development economics: lessons from field labs in the developing world. J. Dev. Stud. 2008, 44(3):311-338.
9. Cardenas J.C., Ostrom E. What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons. Agric. Syst. 2004, 82(3):307-326.
10. Cardenas J.C., Stranlund J., Willis C. Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out. World Dev. 2000, 28(10):1719-1733.
11. Cardenas J.C., Ahn T.K., Ostrom E. Communication and cooperation in a common pool resource dilemma: a field experiment. Adv. Understanding Strategic Behav. Game Theory Exp. Bound Rationality 2004, 258-286.
12. Cardenas J.C., Rodriguez L.A., Johnson N. Collective action for watershed management: field experiments in Colombia and Kenya. Environ. Dev. Econ. 2011, 16(3):275-303.
13. Deci E.L. Effect of externally mediated reward on intrinsic motivations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1971, 18:105-115.
14. Drucker A.G. An application of the use of safe-minimum standards in conservation of livestock biodiversity. Environ. Dev. Econ. 2006, 11:77-94.
15. Engel S., Pagiola S., Wunder S. Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: an overview of the issues. Ecol. Econ. 2008, 65(4):663-674.
16. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) The state of the world's animal genetic resources for food and agriculture 2007, (Rome, 511 pp.). B. Rischkowsky, D. Pilling (Eds.).
17. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) The Second Report on the State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 2010, (Rome, 399 pp.).
18. Fehr E., Falk A. Psychological foundations of incentives. Eur. Econ. Rev. 2002, 46(4):687-724.
19. Fehr E., Fischbacher U. The nature of human altruism. Nature 2003, 425(6960):785-791.
20. Fehr E., Gächter S. Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. J. Econ. Perspect. 2000, 14(3):159-181.
21. Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q. J. Econ. 1999, 114(3):817-868.
22. Fehr E., Schmidt K.M. The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism-experimental evidence and new theories. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity 2006, 1:615-691. (Access Online via Elsevier).
23. Fehr E., Fischbacher U., Gächter S. Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Hum. Nat. 2002, 13(1):1-25.
24. Ferraro P.J., Kiss A. Direct payment to conserve biodiversity. Science 2002, 298:1718-1719.
25. Fischbacher U., Gächter S. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free-riding in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 2010, 100(1):541-556.
26. Fischbacher U., Gächter S., Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public good experiment. Econ. Lett. 2001, 71:397-404.
27. Frey B.S. How intrinsic motivation is crowded out and in. Ration. Soc. 1994, 6(3):334-352.
28. Frey B.S., Oberholzer-Gee F. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. Am. Econ. Rev. 1997, 746-755.
29. Frey B., Jegen R. Motivation crowding theory. J. Econ. Surv. 2001, 15(5):586-611.
30. Frey B.S., Stutzer A. Environmental morale and motivation 2006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
31. Frey B., Oberholtzer-Gee F., Eichenberger R. The old lady visits your backyards: a tale of morals and markets. J. Polit. Econ. 1996, 104(6):1297-1313.
32. Gintis H., Bowles S., Boyd R., Fehr E. Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evol. Hum. Behav. 2003, 24(3):153-172.
33. Gneezy U., Rustichini A. A fine is a price. J. Leg. Stud. 2000, 29:1.
34. Haan M.A., Kooreman P., Riemersma T. Friendship in a Public Good Experiment 2006.
35. Hayo B., Vollan B. Group interaction, heterogeneity, rules, and co-operative behaviour: evidence from a common-pool resource experiment in South Africa and Namibia. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2012, 81(1):9-28.
36. Kerr J., Vardhan M., Jindal R. Prosocial behavior and incentives: evidence from field experiments in rural Mexico and Tanzania. Ecol. Econ. 2012, 73:220-227.
37. Keser C., Van Winden F. Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scand. J. Econ. 2000, 102(1):23-39.
38. Ketelaar T., Tung Au W. The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: an affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. Cogn. Emot. 2003, 17(3):429-453.
39. Kinzig A.P., Perrings C., Chapin F.S., Polasky S., Smith V.K., Tilman D., Turner B.L. Paying for ecosystem services-promise and peril. Science 2011, 334(6056):603-604.
40. Landell-Mills N., Porras I. Silver bullet or fools' gold? 2002, A global review of markets for forest environmental services and their impact on the poor, IIED, London, UK.
41. Ledyard J.O. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. Handbook of experimental economics 1995, Princeton University Press, Princeton. J. Kagel, A. Roth (Eds.).
42. Leider S., Möbius M.M., Rosenblat T., Do Q.A. Directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social networks. Q. J. Econ. 2009, 124(4):1815-1851.
43. Muradian R., Corbera E., Pascual U., Kosoy N., May P.H. Reconciling theory and practice: an alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 2010, 69(6):1202-1208.
44. Muradian R., Arsel M., Pellegrini L., Adaman F., Aguilar B., Agarwal B., Corbera E., Ezzine de Blas D., Farley J., Froger G., Garcia-Frapolli E., Gómez-Baggethun E., Gowdy J., Kosoy N., Le Coq J.F., Leroy P., May P., Méral P., Mibielli P., Norgaard R., Ozkaynak B., Pascual U., Pengue W., Perez M., Pesche D., Pirard R., Ramos-Martin J., Rival L., Saenz F., Van Hecken G., Vatn A., Vira B., Urama K. Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions. Conserv. Lett. 2013, 6(4):274-279.
45. Narloch U., Pascual U., Drucker A.G. Payments for agro-biodiversity conservation services for sustained on farm utilization of plant and animal resources. Ecol. Econ. 2011, 70:1837-1845.
46. Narloch U., Pascual U., Drucker A.G. Collective action dynamics under external rewards: experimental insights from Andean farming communities. World Dev. 2012, 40(10):2096-2107.
47. Narloch U., Pascual U., Drucker How to achieve fairness in payments for ecosystem services? Empirical insights from agrobiodiversity conservation auctions. Land Use Policy 2013, 35:107-118.
48. Ostmann A. External control may destroy the commons. Ration. Soc. 1998, 10(1):103-122.
49. Ostrom E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 1990, Cambridge university press.
50. Ostrom E. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1998, 1-22.
51. Ostrom E. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. J. Econ. Perspect. 2000, 14(3):137-158.
52. Ostrom E. The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common pool resources. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2006, 61:149-163.
53. Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1992, 86(2):404-417.
54. Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources 1994, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, (362 pp.).
55. Ostrom E., Burger J., Field C.B., Norgaard R.B., Policansky D. Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges. Science 1999, 284(5412):278-282.
56. Pålsson A.M. Does the degree of relative risk aversion vary with household characteristics?. J. Econ. Psychol. 1996, 17(6):771-787.
57. Parkhurst G.M., Shogren J.F., Bastian C., Kivi P., Donner J., Smith R.B. Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation. Ecol. Econ. 2002, 41(2):305-328.
58. Pascual U., Muradian R., Rodríguez L.C., Duraiappah A. Exploring the links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: a conceptual approach. Ecol. Econ. 2010, 69(6):1237-1244.
59. Pascual U., Phelps J., Garmendia E., Brown K., Corbera E., Martin A., Gomez-Baggethun E., Muradian R. Social equity matters in payments for ecosystem services. Bioscience 2014, 64(11):1027-1036.
60. Pattanayak S.K., Wunder S., Ferraro P.J. Show me the money: do payments supply environmental services in developing countries. Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy 2010, 4(2):254-274.
61. Peters H.E., Ünür A.S., Clark J., Schulze W.D. Free-riding and the provision of public goods in the family: a laboratory experiment. Int. Econ. Rev. 2004, 45(1):283-299.
62. Prediger S., Vollan B., Frolich M. The impact of culture and ecology on cooperation in a common-pool resource experiment. Ecol. Econ. 2011, 70:1599-1608.
63. Reeson A., Tisdell J. Institutions, motivations and public goods: an experimental test of motivational crowding. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2008, 68:273-281.
64. Reichhuber A., Camacho E., Requate T. A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers. Environ. Dev. Econ. 2009, 47:439-453.
65. Rode J., Gómez-Baggethun E., Krause T. Motivation crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: a review of empirical evidence. Ecol. Econ. 2014, 109:80-92.
66. Rodriguez-Sickert C., Guzmán R.A., Cárdenas J.C. Institutions influence preferences: evidence from a common pool resource experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2008, 67(1):215-227.
67. Rustagi D., Engel S., Kosfeld M. Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management. Science 2010, 330(6006):961-965.
68. Shankar A., Pavitt C. Resource and public goods dilemmas: a new issue for communication research. Rev. Commun. 2002, 2(3):251-272.
69. Smale M., Bellon M.R., Jarvis D., Sthapit B. Economic concepts for designing policies to conserve crop genetic resources on farms. Genet. Resour. Crop. Evol. 2004, 51:121-135.
70. Smith V.L. Economics in the Laboratory. J. Econ. Perspect. 1994, 113-131.
71. Tacconi L. Redefining payments for environmental services. Ecol. Econ. 2012, 73:29-36.
72. Travers H., Clements T., Keane A., Milner-Gulland E.J. Incentives for cooperation: the effects of institutional controls on common pool resource extraction in Cambodia. Ecol. Econ. 2011, 71:151-161.
73. Velez M., Murphy J., Stranlund J. Centralized and Decentralized Management of Local common Pool Resources in the Developing World: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia 2006, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
74. Vollan B. Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa. Ecol. Econ. 2008, 67:560-573.
75. Vollan B. The difference between kinship and friendship: (Field-) experimental evidence on trust and punishment. J. Socio-Econ. 2011, 40(1):14-25.
76. Wunder S. Payment for environmental services: some nuts and bolts. CIFOR Occasional Paper 42 2005, (Bogor, Indonesia).
77. Wunder S. The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation. Conserv. Biol. 2007, 21(1):48-58.
78. Wunder S., Engel S., Pagiola S. Taking stock: a comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries. Ecol. Econ. 2008, 65(4):834-852.