The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 149-163

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Common pool resources; Experimental findings; Institutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748966878     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.008     Document Type: Article

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