Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 215-227

  Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos ^a,b   Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés ^a   Cárdenas, Juan Camilo ^b,c  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

^b SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Common pool resource games; Experimental economics; Internalization of preferences; Learning; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649196511     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004     Document Type: Article

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