Revisiting the commons: Local lessons, global challenges

Science

Volumn 284, Issue 5412, 1999, Pages 278-282

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a   Burger, Joanna ^b   Field, Christopher B ^c   Norgaard, Richard B ^d   Policansky, David ^e  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c GEOPHYSICAL LABORATORY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^e NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; ECOSYSTEM; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; GOVERNMENT; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; POLICY; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES; ECOSYSTEM; GOVERNMENT; OWNERSHIP; PRIVATE SECTOR; PRIVATIZATION; PUBLIC POLICY; PUBLIC SECTOR; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 0033537737     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.284.5412.278     Document Type: Review

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74. This paper profited from ideas discussed at a symposium on "The Commons Revisited; An Americas Perspective" held in conjunction with the X General Assembly of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), June 1998. We thank the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NSF, and NASA for supporting the U.S. National Committee for SCOPE, where this effort began. We thank F. Berkes, A. Blomqvist, P. Dalecki, D. Dodds, K. Dougherty, D. Feeny, T. Hargis-Young, C. Hess, B. J. McCay, M. McGinnis, M. Polski, E. Schlager, N. Sengupta, J. Unruh, O. Young, and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. Supported by NSF grant SBR-9521918, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Ford Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation (E.O.) and by U.S. Department of Energy grant AI DE-FC01-95EW55084 to the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation and National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences grant ESO 5022 (J.B.).