Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 32, Issue , 2015, Pages 238-257

  Cheng, Minying ^a   Lin, Bingxuan ^a,b   Wei, Minghai ^a  

^a SUN YAT SEN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

China; Executive compensation; Family firms; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 84939953771     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.014     Document Type: Article

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