Executive compensation and corporate governance in China

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1158-1175

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   He, Lerong ^b,c  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

China; Equity incentives; Executive compensation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960950692     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006     Document Type: Article

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