Tunneling through Non-Operational Fund Occupancy: An investigation based on officially identified activities

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 32, Issue , 2015, Pages 295-311

  Jiang, Guohua ^b   Rao, Pingui ^a   Yue, Heng ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF JINAN   (China)

^b Peking University   (China)

Author keywords

China; Large shareholders; Non Operational Fund Occupancy; Tunneling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84953638363     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.011     Document Type: Article

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