Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance

Family Business Review

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 121-131

  McConaughy, Daniel L ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84996223572     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2000.00121.x     Document Type: Article

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