Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 167-192

  Leone, Andrew J ^a   Wu, Joanna Shuang ^b   Zimmerman, Jerold L ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracting; Ex post settling up; Management compensation; Pay performance sensitivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746882135     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.04.001     Document Type: Article

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