How are U.S. family firms controlled

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 3047-3091

  Villalonga, Belén ^a   Amit, Raphael ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349144499     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn080     Document Type: Article

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