The Philosophical Personality Argument

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 161, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 227-246

  Feltz, Adam ^a   Cokely, Edward T ^b,c  

^a CMB 6208   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^c MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental philosophy; Intuitions; Personality; Philosophical method; Psychology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856679242     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9731-4     Document Type: Article

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