IN GETTIER’S WAKE

Epistemology: The Key Thinkers

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 214-229

  Turri, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

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Indexed keywords

EID: 85188048711     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (41)

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