Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 167, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 557-567

  Turri, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Assertion; Knowledge; Norms; Rules; Suberogation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892876818     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-013-0112-z     Document Type: Article

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