On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic

Cognition

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 491-503

  Wright, Jennifer Cole ^a  

^a School of Business   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive Bias; Intuition; Intuitional Stability; Order Effect

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; AWARENESS; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INTROSPECTION; INTUITION; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PHILOSOPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; THEORY;

COGNITION; CULTURE; FEMALE; HUMANS; INTUITION; LOGISTIC MODELS; MALE; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 77951667698     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.02.003     Document Type: Article

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