The express knowledge account of assertion

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 89, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 37-45

  Turri, John ^a  

^a HURON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78951471750     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048401003660333     Document Type: Review

References (19)

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14. Sosa, Ernest 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Turri, John 2010. On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80/2.
16. Unger, Peter 1975. Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Weiner, Matthew 2005. Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114/2: 227-51.
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19. Zagzebski, Linda 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.