Actually knowing

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 193, 1998, Pages 453-469

  Hetherington, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949270177     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00114     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Edmund Gettier, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23 (1963), pp. 121-3
2. Although the example is Carl Ginet's, Alvin Goldman brought it to the attention of epistemologists in general, in 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), pp. 771-91, at pp. 772-3
3. 'An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-examples', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52 (1974), pp. 68-9
4. On the philosophical use and epistemic significance of 'intuitions', see G. Bealer, 'On the Possibility of Philosophical Knowledge', Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996), pp. 1-34
5. 'Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards', Synthese, 73 (1987), pp. 3-26, at p. 23 fn. 11
6. Willard Gaylin, 'What You See Is The Real You', in T. Cooley (ed.), The Norton Sampler, 2nd edn (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 160-2, at p. 161
7. See his Philosophical Explanations (Harvard UP, 1981), pp. 172-227
8. The example, from an unpublished paper by John Bigelow, is adapted from Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: its Scope and Limits (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), pp. 170-1
9. 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), pp. 65-73, at p. 71. For brevity, I shall simplify the case a little