Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Cognition

Volumn 129, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 652-661

  Nagel, Jennifer ^a   Juan, Valerie San ^a   Mar, Raymond A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Gettier cases; Individual differences; Justified true belief; Knowledge ascription; Lay beliefs; Mental state inference

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; DENIAL; EMPATHY; ETHNICITY; FEMALE; GETTIER CASE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INDIVIDUALITY; INTUITION; JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF; KNOWLEDGE; LAYPEOPLE; MALE; MENTAL HEALTH; NAMED GROUPS BY OCCUPATION; NORMAL HUMAN; PHILOSOPHER; PHILOSOPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; QUESTIONNAIRE; SCORING SYSTEM; SKEPTICAL PRESSURE CASE; SOCIAL BELIEF; SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY; THINKING;

GETTIER CASES; INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES; JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF; KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTION; LAY BELIEFS; MENTAL STATE INFERENCE;

ADULT; CULTURE; EMPATHY; FEMALE; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; INTUITION; KNOWLEDGE; MALE; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84886721981     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.02.008     Document Type: Article

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