Modelling norms

Modelling Norms

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 1-213

  Elsenbroich, Corinna ^a   Gilbert, Nigel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929025222     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-7052-2     Document Type: Book

References (376)

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