New economics of sociological criminology

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 28, Issue , 2002, Pages 417-442

  McCarthy, Bill ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Crime; Game theory; Rational choice; Social and human capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036025767     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140752     Document Type: Review

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