Emergence of norms through social learning

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1507-1512

  Sen, Sandip ^a   Airiau, Steṕhane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TULSA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGENT COORDINATION; BOTTOM-UP MANNER; INDIVIDUAL AGENT; LEARNING FROM INTERACTIONS; MULTIPLE AGENTS; POPULATION SIZES; RESEARCH QUESTIONS; TOP-DOWN MANNER;

POPULATION STATISTICS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84880856184     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

1. Robert Axelrod. The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of conflict and cooperation. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997.
2. G. Boella and L. Lesmo. A game theoretic approach to norms. Cognitive Science Quarterly, 2(3-4):492-512, 2002.
3. G. Boella and L. van der Torre. Norm governed multiagent systems: The delegation of control to autonomous agents. In Proceedings of IEEE/WIC IAT Conference, pages 329-335. IEEE Press, 2003.
4. Michael Bowling and Manuela Veloso. Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate. Artificial Intelligence, 136:215-250, 2002.
5. F. Dignum, D. Kinny, and L. Sonenberg. From desires, obligations and norms to goals. Cognitive Science Quarterly, 2(3-4):407-430, 2002.
6. Joshua M. Epstein. Learning to be thoughtless: Social norms and individual computation. Computational Economics, 18:9-24, 2001.
7. D. Fudenberg and K. Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
8. A. Garcia-Camino, J.A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and C. Sierra. A rule-based approach to norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 5(5):33-41, 2006.
9. M.R. Genesereth, M.L. Ginsberg, and J.S. Rosenschein. Cooperation without communications. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 51-57, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1986.
10. David Lewis. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press, 1969.
11. Roger B. Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1991.
12. Liviu Panait and Sean Luke. Cooperative multi-agent learning: The state of the art. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 11(3):387-434, 2005.
13. Martin Posch. Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications. Journal of Economic Theory, 65:383-415, 1995.
14. Rob Powers and Yoav Shoham. New criteria and a new algorithm for learning in multiagent systems. In Proceedings of NIPS, 2005.
15. Thomas C. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Havard University Press, 1960.
16. Kagan Tumer and David H. Wolpert. Collective intelligence and Braess' paradox. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 104-109, Menlo Park, CA, 2000. AAAI Press.
17. K. Tuyls and A. Nowé. Evolutionary game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 20(1):63-90, March 2006.
18. Javier Vázquez-Salceda, Huib Aldewereld, and Frank Dignum. Norms in multiagent systems: From theory to practice. International Journal of Computer Systems & Engineering, 20(4):225-236, 2005.
19. C. J. C. H. Watkins and P. D. Dayan. Q-learning. Machine Learning, 3:279-292, 1992.
20. Peyton H. Young. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica, 61:57-84, January 1993.
21. Peyton H. Young. The economics of convention. The Jounal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2):105-122, Spring 1996.