The role of family involvement on CEO turnover: Evidence from Colombian family firms

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 266-284

  González, Maximiliano ^a   Guzmán, Alexander ^b   Pombo, Carlos ^a   Trujillo, María Andrea ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^b CESA School of Business in Bogotá ^*  (Colombia)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; CEO Turnover; Corporate Governance; Emerging Markets; Family Firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928555706     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12083     Document Type: Article

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