Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 179-194

  Schulze, William S ^a   Lubatkin, Michael H ^b   Dino, Richard N ^c  

^a CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038809082     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/30040613     Document Type: Article

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