Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover in Italy

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 61-90

  Volpin, Paolo F ^a  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive turnover; Pyramidal groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036234941     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00071-5     Document Type: Article

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