Corporate diversification and CEO turnover in family businesses: Self-entrenchment or risk reduction?

Small Business Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 57-76

  Tsai, Wen Hsien ^a   Kuo, Yi Chen ^b   Hung, Jung Hua ^a  

^a NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b ST JOHN'S UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Agency theory; CEO turnover; Corporate diversification; Corporate governance; Family businesses; Survival analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649277018     PISSN: 0921898X     EISSN: 15730913     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11187-007-9073-y     Document Type: Article

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