Why do boards differ? Because owners do: Assessing ownership impact on board composition

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 373-389

  Sur, Sujit ^a   Lvina, Elena ^b   Magnan, Michel ^c  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b SAINT JOSEPH S UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Canada   (Canada)

Author keywords

Board composition; Corporate governance; Director independence; Ownership; Structural equation modeling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879089794     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/corg.12021     Document Type: Article

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