The future of business groups in emerging markets: Long-run evidence from Chile

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 268-285

  Khanna, Tarun ^a   Palepu, Krishna ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034339386     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1556395     Document Type: Article

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