Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

Journal of Economics and Business

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 112-139

  Gutiérrez, Luis H ^a   Pombo, Carlos ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO   (Colombia)

^b Universidad de los Andes   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Colombian corporations; Corporate control; Corporate governance; Firm value; Multiple blockholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549098557     PISSN: 01486195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2008.01.002     Document Type: Article

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