Are political connections a blessing or a curse? Evidence from CEO turnover in China

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 179-194

  You, Jiaxing ^a   Du, Guqian ^b  

^a XIAMEN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Business Government Relations; CEO Succession Policy; Corporate Governance; Emerging Market Economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856216800     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: 14678683     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00902.x     Document Type: Article

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