Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing

Emerging Markets Review

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 626-649

  González, Maximiliano ^a   Guzmán, Alexander ^b   Pombo, Carlos ^a   Trujillo, María Andrea ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^b NONE   (Colombia)

Author keywords

Colombia; Family businesses; Family control; Financial performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867606085     PISSN: 15660141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2012.09.003     Document Type: Article

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