Law, legalization, and politics: An agenda for the next generation of IL/IR scholars

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 33-56

  Abbott, Kenneth W ^a   Snidal, Duncan ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84895183375     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139107310.003     Document Type: Chapter

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