Is the international court of justice biased?

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 599-630

  Posner, Eric A ^a   De Figueiredo, Miguel F P ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26944489995     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/430765     Document Type: Article

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