Flexibility in international agreements

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 175-196

  Helfer, Laurence R ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84928279434     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139107310.010     Document Type: Chapter

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