Against compliance

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 591-610

  Martin, Lisa L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896495850     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139107310.029     Document Type: Chapter

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