How international law works: A response to commentators

International Theory

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 335-343

  Guzman, Andrew T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956244236     PISSN: 17529719     EISSN: 17529727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1752971909990091     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Abbott K.W., Snidal D. (2000), ‘Hard and soft law in international governance’, International Organization 54: 421–456.
2. Brewster R. (2009), ‘The limits of reputation on compliance’, International Theory 1(2): 323–333.
3. Guzman A.T. (2008a), How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Guzman A.T. (2008b), ‘International tribunals: a rational choice analysis’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157: 171–235.
5. Guzman A.T., Simmons B.A. (2002), ‘To settle or empanel? An empirical analysis of litigation and settlement at the WTO’, Journal of Legal Studies 31: S205–S235.
6. Guzman A.T., Simmons B.A. (2005), ‘Power plays and capacity constraints: the selection of defendants in WTO disputes’, Journal of Legal Studies 34: 557–598.
7. Hathaway O.A. (2008), ‘Treaties’ end: the past, present, and future of international lawmaking in the United States’, Yale Law Journal 117: 1236–1362.
8. Kydd A.H. (2009), ‘A bridge too near? Guzman on international law’, International Theory 1(2): 295–305.
9. Martin L.L. (2000), Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Simmons B.A. (2000), ‘International law and state behavior: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs’, American Political Science Review 94(4): 819–835.
11. Thompson A. (2009), ‘The rational enforcement of international law: overcoming the sanctioners’ dilemma’, International Theory 1(2): 307–321.
12. Tomz M. (2007), Reputation and International Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press.